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Violence and conflict 
a b s t r a c t 
Many discussions of mafia and criminal entrepreneurs typically focus on violence and illegality, and less on their 
possible roles in rural transformation, even when they are located in borderland economies linking the subsistence 
cultivators of illicit crops to regional and global markets. This paper assesses the life stories of drug lords, the 
Castaño brothers of Colombia and Roberto Suárez Gomez of Bolivia, to draw inferences into how such rural elites 
in the illicit drugs trade are not only specialists in crime but are also actors who regulate and manipulate, often 
coercively, access to land and resources, mobilise labour and shape its divisions, and promote certain forms of 
capital accumulation. This paper contends that a better understanding of the roles of these rural elites as pioneers 
for capital, intermediaries in commodity chains, and arbitrageurs between state and borderlands may provide 

























































This paper argues that because illicit crops are commodities pro-
uced mainly in marginalised borderlands ( UNODC, 2019 : 62–74), it
s necessary to locate and analyse its criminal entrepreneurs in their ru-
al contexts. How do they shape and are in turn shaped by conflict and
ontestation over the control of territory, the regulation and manipu-
ation of access to land and resources, the reordering of the agrarian
abour supply, and the outcomes of state formation? 
Such emphasis is often lost because key publications that shape pol-
cy, like the Systematic Country Diagnostics produced by the World
ank, and the World Drug Reports published by the UN Office on
rugs and Crime, often ignore the politico-economic roles of criminal
ctors, especially in agrarian settings ( Gutierrez, 2020 ). These sustain
ssumptions that ‘war is development in reverse’ or economic growth
s the best solution for tackling and preventing conflict and criminality
 Collier et al., 2003 ); or that since the central actor in conflicts is the
tate, investing in state capacity and presence in borderland areas neces-
arily leads to conflict prevention ( United Nations & World Bank, 2018 ).
hese assumptions not only create blind spots on the role of illicit ac-
ors, but also, as some scholars have pointed out, preclude how licit ‘eco-
omic growth and development’ can itself ‘be violent and be the source
f criminality and conflict’ ( Thomson, 2011 : 322), and distort the under-
tanding of spaces depicted as ‘ungovernable’ or ‘stateless’ when really
hese are territories ‘wracked by extra-legal regimes of rule in which the
tate is simply one actor amongst others’ ( Ballve, 2019 : 211). E-mail address: ericdantegutierrez@gmail.com 
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tional Journal of Drug Policy, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2020.1030In addition, there is a paucity of literature on illicit crop enterprise
nd its main actors. Key works on organised crime, for example, are typ-
cally focused on violence and illegality, with little or no emphasis on
grarian spaces. Gambetta’s classic work on the mafia analyses a priva-
ised industry of providing protection ( Gambetta, 1993 and Diego 2011 :
). Varese’s study elaborates on the migration of criminal enterprise in
 globalising world ( Federico 2011 ). Volkov’s ‘violent entrepreneur’ re-
aking Russian capitalism explains crime ‘as a result of the failure of
ifferent social institutions to ensure the proper social integration of in-
ividuals and groups’ ( Volkov, 2002 : 17). Lessing’s well-argued study
npacks how drug cartel violence is used to constrain the state’s be-
aviour and influence policy outcomes ( Lessing, 2015 : 1486). In crit-
cal agrarian studies, there are few materials, even when a focus on
llicit economies can contribute to the approaches and lacunae enumer-
ted by Bernstein and Byres in their inaugural essay in the Journal of
grarian Change ( Bernstein and Byres, 2001 ); and to the perspectives,
rameworks and methodologies listed by Borras in the 2009 relaunch
f the Journal of Peasant Studies ( Borras, 2009 ). Examining rural illicit
ntrepreneurs can contribute to the ‘new directions in agrarian political
conomy’ discussed by Fairbairn et al. on ‘the variegated trajectories of
grarian change across space and time’ ( Fairbairn et al., 2014 : 653). In
he same way that McMichael presented food regime analysis, illicit crop
nterprise analysis may also ‘explain the strategic role of agriculture …
n the construction of the world capitalist economy’ ( McMichael, 2019 :
39). article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
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lassifying entrepreneurs of the illicit crops trade as rural actors 
Placing criminal actors within contexts of rural transformation,
herefore, would usefully complement the policy and broader literature,
nd may also provide ways of unpacking key challenges to peacebuild-
ng and transitions from war economies to peace economies in typically
onflict-affected borderlands where illicit economies thrive. Indeed, a
rowing number of studies have demonstrated the need for this ap-
roach. A key contribution from McSweeney, et.al. on drug trafficking-
elated agrarian change asks, ‘why do narcos invest in rural land?’,
why now?’ and ‘why there?’, and conclude that drug traffickers ‘has-
en the transformation of landscapes of smallholder production into
he “rentier-agribusiness ” nexus of land speculation, cattle, and export
onocrops’ ( 2017 : 5–6, 16). Richani used the label narcobourgeoisie to
ifferentiate drug traffickers from other bourgeois factions (2013: 196–
15). Ballve’s conclusion on ‘narco-frontiers’, that the illicit drugs trade
s inducing violent agrarian change all over the world, is particularly
elevant (2019: 211). 
This article is an attempt to examine violent agrarian change of nar-
obourgeoisies and narco-frontiers within contexts of rural transforma-
ion. Its argument – drawn from Blok (1974) and key literature on bandit
tudies ( Hobsbawm, 2000 [1959]; Gallant, 1999 ) – is that criminal en-
repreneurs of illicit crops are not just predatory actors, or exceptional
riminals as commonly depicted. They can be categorised as opposites
f Hobsbawm’s social bandits; or as Gallant’s predator-merchants who
erform important but curiously unacknowledged roles ‘in the spread
nd global triumph of capitalism’. They also shape state formation, be-
ause put simply, ‘bandits helped make states, and states made bandits’
 Gallant, 1999 : 25–26). 
In the Mafia of a Sicilian Village ( Blok, 1974 ), Blok contends that
riminal actors are essentially embedded in society, the economy, and
tate institutions, and are therefore necessarily engaged or locked in
nterdependent relationships, whether friend or foe, with other actors.
ecause they make decisions that affect the public, they are not just
lain gangsters or racketeers. Blok showed how mafiosos became the
force for change’ that shaped the effective distribution of land, patterns
f land use, and the consequent division of labour resulting from shifts
nto livestock raising, thus principally re-organising peasant society into
ore commercial forms of agriculture ( Blok, 1974 : 6; and tables on 245–
52). In other words, they were not only criminals but arguably, also
olanyian change agents who used their coercive capacity to break up
he bonds and institutions that held peasant society together, in the pro-
ess enabling the introduction of more capitalist forms of development
nto the local areas they inhabited ( Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 171–172) . 
 note on methods 
To develop its argument, this paper examines the life stories of the
astaño brothers of Colombia and Roberto Suárez Gomez of Bolivia. A
ife story, as Ojermark explains, is an account of a person’s story of his or
er life, or a segment of it, as told to another; while life histories is the ac-
ount of a life based on interviews and conversations ( Ojermark, 2007 :
). The use of life stories as a unit of analysis has been shown to offer
eaningful insights (see for example McCoy, ed. 1994 : 1–11) and can
e linked to Historical Institutionalism, the approach to studying poli-
ics and social change elaborated by Thelen and Steinmo, who posited
hat social outcomes are ultimately shaped and mediated, constrained
nd refracted, though never solely, by institutions designed and chosen
y people. Hence, political evolution is influenced by the intentions of
ts subjects ( Thelen and Steinmo, 1992 : 1–3). Thus, using life stories
an illuminate on ‘branching processes’, particularly points of depar-
ure from established patterns that lead to outcomes like the mediation
f state control or resilience to drug prohibition. 
The examination of these life stories enables inferences to be drawn
nto how drug lords act as rural elites promoting, whether intentionally
r otherwise, specific forms of local and economic order. In addition, the2 ystematic selection of life stories can be used to harnesses rich, localised
nowledge. Comparing life stories can expand the ‘political imagina-
ion’ and develop conceptual models, and as explained by Mollinga and
ondhalekar, bring into view new possibilities ( Mollinga and Gond-
alekar, 2014 : 183). 
But like other methods, there are of course limitations. Often, in-
ormation about criminal actors is hidden or may remain incomplete,
neven, or piecemeal when verified. Hence, the stories presented nec-
ssarily privileges one set over others, and reflects the agenda of the
esearcher. Often, the material gathered may not constitute grounds for
aking or disproving generalisations. Nevertheless, life stories, espe-
ially when compared with others, can still be useful sources especially
ince, as Hospers elaborated, in ordinary life we claim knowledge not
nly from observation but from inference: when we see bear tracks in
he mud, we can infer that a bear has been there, even if we didn’t see
ne (1990: 72). 
The next two sections elaborate on the life stories and criminal ca-
eers of the Castaños and Suárez. The main sources for the Castaños are
he biography (of Carlos) by Aranguren; court case records and deci-
ions; and varied news reports. Aranguren’s book is sometimes referred
o as Carlos’ autobiography. The main source for Suárez is his biography
ritten by wife Ayda Levy, supplemented by family records from the
yHeritage.com website, memoirs of Michael Levine (a former agent of
he US Drug Enforcement Administration), and news reports. To miti-
ate the obvious bias of these sources, the information has been carefully
ross-referenced with other sources and treated critically. 
eciphering the Castaños of Colombia: 1979 to 2007 
The Castaño-Gils were a brood of 12 children from a ranching fam-
ly with roots in Antioquia ( Verdad Abierta, December 2008a ). From
980, three brothers – Fidel (born in 1950), Vicente (1957) and Carlos
1965) ( McDermott, 2008 ; Verdad Abierta, 2008b ; Philip 2009 ) – shot
o infamy as fearsome paramilitary leaders who used extreme levels of
iolence and coercion to fight a growing leftist insurgency, and in the
rocess, appear to have contributed significantly to the transformation
f northern Colombia into a supply chain for transnational agriculture. 
In 1995 after the Medellin and Cali ‘cartels’ were eliminated follow-
ng a US-led war on drugs, Colombia’s then-scattered illicit drug business
id not crumble. Instead, it was picked up by orphaned criminals and
he proletariat of the illicit trade who had the knowledge, skills, and
onnections to carry on with the business ( Crandall, 2002 : 160). In the
iddle of this transformation were the Castaños. After Fidel, the eldest,
as killed in 1994, it fell upon Carlos and Vicente to consolidate their
nfluence and power. But they did more than just rebuild the illicit busi-
ess: they sourced new allies and built an important political platform
or it – the paramilitary network Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia or AUC
United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia), which prides itself as a self-
reated ‘movement’ of its members, and not a tool made or instigated
y the state ( Aranguren, 2001 : Chapter 5). 
he rise of the Castaños 
The eight boys and four girls of the Castaño-Gil brood were raised
n La Blanquita, an estate in Amalfi, a municipality 143 km northeast of
edellin. Amalfi lies adjacent to the sub-region known as Uraba, which
overs northern portions of the provinces of Antioquia and Choco (in-
luding the entire land border with Panama), and western portions of
ordoba. Uraba retains its identity, not only because of its long his-
ory of racialised colonial violence as the site of Spain’s first colonial
ettlement where enslaved Africans were sent to mine for gold along
he Atrato River ( Ballve, 2020 : 49), but also because it became a ‘drug-
rafficking real estate’ sitting astride the key drug movement corridors
rom the centre of Colombia towards departure points in both the Pacific
nd Atlantic seaboards ( McDermott 2014 ). 
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Carlos’ biography states that sometime in July 1979, the family’s
atriarch, Jesus Antonio, was kidnapped by the left-wing rebel group
ARC ( Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary
rmed Forces of Colombia ) . This came as a bitter disappointment to
he family, since two brothers, Ramiro and Manuel, socialised with the
uerrillas, and their father also let the rebels camp on their El Hundi-
or farm. Three ransom notes were sent, and the first two were paid.
he third ransom note for 50 million pesos (about $20,000) came in
ebruary 1980, but it appears the father was dead by then. Apparently,
esus rebelled in captivity, did not eat, and became ill. After a surprise
kirmish, the guerrillas suspected a military rescue was afoot and be-
ame convinced their hostage was valuable to the military, hence he
as shot. A peasant who saw the body before it was removed by the
uerrillas confirmed the death to the brothers. The body was never re-
overed ( Aranguren, 2001 : 38–40). 
‘Our revenge lasted two years,’ said Carlos, who at the time was 14,
hile eldest brother Fidel was 29. First found was Conrado Ramirez,
ne of four seen taking their father from La Blanquita. The information
as relayed to the Army, who promptly arrested Ramirez, but a magis-
rate thought to be sympathetic to the FARC said Fidel’s evidence was
earsay, hence, ordered Ramirez’s release. Three days later as Ramirez
merged from the Fujiyama residences, Fidel shot him dead. It was
he ‘first extra-judicial execution of the Autodefensas in the name of
 genuine justice that does not yet exist in Colombia’, claimed Carlos
 Aranguren, 2001 : 44). The Castaños killed in total seven FARC mem-
ers linked to their father’s kidnapping. 
The kidnapping is ‘where it all began’, explains Carlos. Soon, the
rothers set up the vigilante group ‘ Las Tangas ’, named after Fidel’s
anch. Before long, Los Tangueros enjoyed the backing of local ranch-
rs, businessmen and the army who found them a useful force check-
ng guerrilla activity ( McDermott, 2008 ; Verdad Abierta, 2012 ). The
angueros , however, were more than just simple providers of protec-
ion, and the context in which they emerged offers clues into the logic
nd purpose of their violence. A number of cases heard at the Inter-
merican Court on Human Rights (CorteIDH), which acts alongside the
nter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), provide details.
he court’s 178-page judgement on the Pueblo Bello massacre heard ex-
ert testimonies that the location of Fidel’s ranches, including Las Tan-
as, served as a strategic deterrent to guerrilla expansion. Not only did
he ranches and its vigilantes sit in a cattle-raising region where guer-
illas collected war taxes from businessmen and livestock owners, they
ere also linked to the road networks that comprised the extremely prof-
table Eje Bananero (banana axle), the centre of which was the highway
rom Medellin to the port city of Turbo ( CorteIDH, 2006 : 46–47). 
The development of the highway, the Court heard, changed the eco-
omic structure and demographics of the region and consequently cre-
ted rising social and political tensions. In the 1950s, forested areas were
hinned out by logging operations that extended south, opening land to
ore unplanned smallholder peasant settlements. In the 1960s, how-
ver, the largely subsistence peasant agriculture was displaced by the
rrival of Frutera Sevilla, the renamed United Fruit Company. The com-
any introduced a banana contract-growing scheme to Uraba landown-
rs, most of whom were raising cattle. The transition was aided by gen-
rous loans provided by the Corporacion Financiera Colombiana de De-
arrollo Industrial, which received US bank credits under the Alliance
or Progress, a US $20-billion initiative to provide a ‘peaceful, demo-
ratic, capitalist alternative to the Cuban Revolution’. Under the new
cheme, Frutera Sevilla did not grow its bananas, but bought it from
ontract growers with an assured minimum price. The company then in-
ested in road, canal- and drainage-building, deepened several streams,
nd acquired barges and tugs that carried the bananas to its ocean-going
hips ( CorteIDH, 2006 : 25–47; New York Times, 1971 ; US Congressional
ecord, 1964 ). 
This period of ‘development’, however, created a chain of intended
nd unintended consequences. With land values increasing rapidly,
redatory speculators displaced and dispossessed the smallholder peas-3 nt population. Eventually, many survived by becoming wage workers
or the banana contract-growers, typically without the benefit of labour
tandards and legal protection. Meanwhile, cattle ranching served fur-
her to hold and control land while waiting for expected huge rises in
roperty values. Thus, the conversion of peripheral areas to the north
nd east of the highway for cattle farming created further land con-
icts and peasant displacements. Eventually, social and political forces
merged to confront each other: two rebel groups, the FARC and the EPL
 Ejercito Popular de Liberacion or Popular Liberation Army) that declared
upport for the peasants; and government-authorised and often Army-
rmed civilian forces that supported the cattle ranchers, banana growers
nd plantation owners. This became the central element of confronta-
ion in the region ( CorteIDH, 2006 : 24–26 and 45–47). According to a
988 report from DAS (Administrative Department of Security), it led
to the polarization of positions, transformed the area into a war zone,
nd generated a power vacuum that encouraged all manner of atrocities’
 IACHR, 1994 : 3–4). 
It was within such context that the Castaño brothers emerged. After
heir father’s death and due to the rising tensions with the guerrillas, the
rothers sought a new area in which to regroup. Led by Fidel, Carlos
tressed they wanted a strategic location near the banana plantations
hat was equidistant to the three departments of Cordoba, Antioquia,
nd Choco, and which had access to the sea and border areas. They
ried San Juan, on the coast, but abandoned the effort after guerrillas
illed ‘some of our boys’. Instead, they moved closer to Cordoba where
hey could better endure guerrilla retaliation, and where many ranches
ad been abandoned. Eventually they found the 2100-hectare estate Las
angas, near Monteria, the provincial capital. Fidel purchased the prop-
rty in 1983, but the prosecutor in a case against him said Fidel only
aid the first instalment, and later kidnapped the son of the rancher,
recovered’ his payment, and then murdered the original owners ( Ver-
ad Abierta, 14 September 2012). Las Tangas, said Carlos, was the first
rea they ‘liberated’, which became a refuge and training ground for the
aramilitaries thereafter ( Aranguren, 2001 : 70 and 110). 
An expert witness in the cases against Fidel told the court that the
astaños’ paramilitary army was financed by drug profits (CorteIDH,
5–26). As the Castaños expanded to adjacent municipalities until the
ulf of Morrosquillo, expelling EPL guerrillas in the process, ranchers
tarted returning, claimed Carlos. ‘If it is a business for the guerril-
as to impoverish the regions’, he added, ‘Fidel considered it a thriv-
ng business to enrich those regions’. Fidel, said Carlos, was essen-
ially a capitalist ( Aranguren, 2001 : 113). Whether intended or unin-
ended, the Tangueros effectively contributed to the transformation of
he smallholder-led agrarian economy into a supply chain for capitalist,
ommercial agriculture on one hand, and illicit coca production, on the
ther. Violence and terror were their tools in destroying opposition. 
Between 1988 and 1990, the paramilitaries committed more than 20
assacres, all linked to social tensions arising from the region’s agricul-
ural commercialisation. Carlos claimed not all these were their doing:
ome were committed by paramilitaries outside the Castaño network;
nd some took place even before they established presence in central
raba (ibid., 109). The main atrocities were: 
• Currulao (Turbo), March 4, 1988: 17 people, all active members of
SINTAGRO (the Union of Agrarian Workers of Antioquia) were mur-
dered to intimidate voters from voting for the Union Patriotica, con-
sidered the legal party of the FARC ( IACHR, 1994 ). 
• Buenavista (Cordoba), April 3, 1988: 28 people executed as the
Tangueros looked for an EPL leader involved in kidnapping. 
• Punta Coquitos (Turbo), April 11, 1988: 27 banana workers mur-
dered, apparently by killers under contract from ACDEGAM or As-
sociation of Farmers and Cattlemen of Magdalena Medio ( El Espec-
tador, 2018 ). 
• Canalete (Cordoba), August 30, 1988: 16 victims killed. 
• Pueblo Bello (Cordoba), December 1989 – 43 peasants were kid-
napped, brought to Las Tangas, interrogated and tortured. Thirty-
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m  seven disappeared and only six bodies were found ( CorteIDH, 2006 :
26; 47–52). 
he mutation of the Castaños 
Fidel was the family’s main entrepreneur who made money from
ining, land speculation, art trading, and drugs trafficking, subse-
uently investing his profits in Las Tangas ( Verdad Abierta, 2008a ). His-
usiness network brought him into contact with Pablo Escobar. As the
elationship expanded, Fidel was given charge of maintaining a supply
hain in Bolivia for what was then the largest cocaine processing net-
ork in the world. Carlos, meanwhile, rose to become a prolific sicario
assassin) of the Medellin cartel and the family’s chief enforcer. Vicente
as deployed to Los Angeles where he handled the distribution end of
he drug business ( McDermott, 2008 ). 
When Escobar brought the Medellin cartel into war with the Colom-
ian state in 1989, Fidel was amongst those who disagreed. In early
992 when Escobar was in prison under a negotiated surrender, he
ummoned Fidel, Fernando Galeano and Gerardo Moncada to a meet-
ng. Only Galeano and Moncada turned up and ended up dead, believed
illed by Escobar himself. It was then that Fidel set up PEPES or People
ersecuted by Pablo Escobar ( Aranguren, 2001 : 97–99). Fidel’s rebellion
as critical to the downfall of Escobar because as McDermott explains,
Fidel set about proving he could be even more brutal than Escobar’.
ith support from Colombia’s security forces, and allegedly the DEA
tself, Fidel typically set off two bombs for every bomb Escobar set off,
argeting the Medellin chief’s properties. Fidel also attacked Escobar’s
ccountants, lawyers, and supporters. After his escape from prison, Es-
obar was finally tracked and shot dead by a police sniper in December
993 ( McDermott, 2008 ). 
The emergence of the Castaños as criminal entrepreneurs who were
t the same time fearsome paramilitary forces gave them connections
nd a powerful ally providing strategic protection – the military. By be-
oming a credible force against leftist guerrillas, they transformed from
unted gangsters to criminal entrepreneurs serving a useful political
urpose. This change is demonstrated in a case in which businessmen
yeing palm oil plantations approached Vicente and his paramilitaries in
he late 1990s to be partners in a project. According to Bernal-Bermudez,
he businessmen found the Curbarado and Jiguamiando river basins in
hoco to be ideal for palm oil plantations – it had the right climate,
oil, a supply of cheap land and labour, and was close to Pacific trading
orts. Vicente’s role was to ensure that land and labour would remain
vailable throughout the project. This was significant, explains Bernal-
ermudez, because it was the first case of business taking the initia-
ive to approach the paramilitaries for a partnership, when previously it
as always the other way around when paramilitaries approached busi-
esses offering security in exchange for financial contributions ( Bernal-
ermudez, 2017 : 228–229). 
On January 6, 1994, just a month after Escobar was killed, Fidel
as himself shot dead in an accidental clash with EPL guerrillas (not
he FARC as widely reported), which according to Carlos, were already
early defeated. But Carlos kept Fidel’s death a secret, fearing demorali-
ation amongst their ranks. He even answered a questionnaire sent by a
eporter in May 1994 pretending to be Fidel. Only after that ‘interview’s’
ublication did the family realise Fidel was dead. A twist in this story
s that when the identity of Fidel’s killer was found, the man had aban-
oned the EPL and was already fighting for Carlos against the FARC. He
as identified as Commander Sarley (Francisco Morelo Peñata), who
ever knew the man he shot. Fidel the founder of the Autodefensas died
n anonymity. Carlos forgave Sarley, who rose to become his second in
ommand ( Aranguren, 2001 : Chapter 1). 
After burying Fidel, Carlos took the reins of Los Tangueros, and
aunched sustained attacks on FARC strongholds in Uraba. Carlos then
stablished, along with Vicente, the Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba
 Urabá or ACCU (Peasant Self-Defence Forces of Cordoba and Uraba),
ncorporating into their ranks former EPL members and FARC desert-4 rs. By terrifying the local population into denying FARC even a glass
f water, ACCU expanded and by the end of 1996, ‘had done the impos-
ible – it drove FARC rebels out of Uraba’ ( McDermott, 2008 ). FARC’s
etback in Uraba had far-reaching implications – processes of peasant
isplacement, land dispossession, and land speculation were now en-
bled without significant opposition. 
he multi-purpose franchise of a paramilitary brand 
The creation of ACCU marked a turning point, notes Grajales, be-
ause for the first time in Colombia’s long history of armed conflict, ‘a
aramilitary group was endowed with the image of a politico-military
rganisation, with internal hierarchies, subdivisions and military ranks’.
he ACCU defined itself as ‘a counter-subversive armed organisation’
nd a ‘civil resistance movement’. Carlos then started pushing for closer
oordination between the country’s paramilitary groups. In 1997, the
ational network AUC was established, with Carlos as its spokesman
 Grajales, 2015 : 7). 
But Vicente and Carlos appear to have had different views on AUC’s
urpose. While Carlos built the AUC into a politico-military force, Vi-
ente used it as a network for drugs trafficking. Vicente started selling
franchises’ to drug traffickers and other armed groups by highlight-
ng a key ‘benefit’: an AUC affiliation could change a drug trafficking
rganisation’s status from criminal to political actor. Because a ‘fran-
hise’ allowed the buyer the right to use the AUC name and logo, and
et an official rank within the organisation, it potentially offers immu-
ity from prosecution or extradition to the US. It turned common mob-
ters, following payment of a franchise fee, into armed political actors
 Grajales, 2015 ). These differences between the brothers have been sug-
ested in Verdad Abierta accounts but could not be confirmed or denied
n Aranguren’s book which, strangely, has no mention of Vicente at all
n its 242 pages. This, in itself, may be an indication of the brothers’
strangement. Carlos apparently struggled with the dilemma of taking
rug money to fund ‘the cause’. For example, in Chapter 14, he claims
osing sleep over using drug money to buy 4500 rifles from Central
merica, but went ahead because he didn’t want to be ‘the idealistic
ommander who lost the war’. 
For some criminals, the franchise not only gave some form of le-
itimacy but also provided cover and protection. amongst the fran-
hisees were ‘the Twins’ (Los Mellizos) – enterprising cocaine traffick-
rs from Cali caught in conflict between competing groups who sought
he protection of the Castaños. In 2001, a police raid on one of their
partments in Bogota yielded $35 million in cash. By 2004, they had
een named in the list of 12 most-wanted traffickers by the US. By
stablishing the paramilitary group Bloque Vencedores de Arauca and
uying a franchise from the AUC, they effectively avoided extradition
 Verdad Abierta, 2008c ). 
Thus, a type of fuzzy actor emerged who could claim to be a political
ctivist but at the same time was neither exclusively a paramilitary nor
xclusively a narco. Effectively, they continue the 17th century tradi-
ion identified by Gallant about bandits who became patriots, and vice
ersa, depending on their relationships with the state ( Gallant, 1999 ).
ome franchisees calling themselves ‘transitional armed group’ further
lurred boundaries. Grajales (2015) importantly argues that contrary to
heir common image as ‘outlaws’ operating outside the state and formal
conomy, these actors operate very much like politicians and business-
en who invest time and effort in building the legitimacy that enables
urvival and expansion. amongst their various mechanisms, the most
seful has been the AUC franchise, which shapes the social construction
f what constitutes illicit business and criminality in quite unexpected
ays. 
he death of the brothers 
By the end of 2002, Carlos was negotiating with the national govern-
ent for the demobilisation of the paramilitary structures that he helped
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t  reate, thereby increasingly straining his relationship with Vicente. AUC
aramilitaries, many of them wanted for extradition to the US, worried
bout what Carlos might tell the Americans. On April 16, 2004, Carlos
as reported killed. Vicente’s right-hand man, Jesus Ignacio Roldan or
onoleche later confessed to carrying out the assassination under orders
rom Vicente himself ( McDermott, 2008 ). 
By November 2006, over 30,000 paramilitaries had demobilised.
icente himself applied to demobilise but in early 2007 went into
iding with Hernan Hernandez to organise a retaliation against the
overnment. He canvassed support, asking AUC commanders to do-
ate $250,000 each for a war chest, but only received two responses
 Verdad Abierta, 2008b ). Hernandez himself was hesitant. On March
1, 2007 four men reportedly killed Vicente. Many believed Hernandez
rchestrated the killing, but he denies it, triggering rumours that Vi-
ente deliberately organised his own disappearance ( McDermott, 2008 ).
owever, proof that he was indeed dead was the scramble that ensued
mongst various paramilitaries under Vicente’s influence to take posses-
ion of the Castaños’ houses and accumulated landholdings, including
as Tangas. 
Carlos wanted a political paramilitary as an anti-thesis to the FARC,
ith whom they battled bitterly. Vicente created the infrastructure for a
ecentralised capitalist enterprise in illicit drugs. Despite differences in
ntentions, the Castaños can be collectively credited for consolidating a
articular form of local economic order in the territories they inhabited.
uárez and Bolivia’s upper-class drug barons: 1970–1988 
‘The drugs industry,’ according to The Economist , ‘is simple and prof-
table. Its simplicity makes it easy to organise; its profitability makes it
ard to stop’ ( The Economist 2018 ). But profitability alone is insufficient
n explaining its remarkable resilience. Without protection, profitability
ill not last. Profitability is not automatic in many contexts – it needs to
e carefully constructed and maintained. A business that acts as a useful
ntermediator and keeps the right partners will continue to be needed.
hese are the beliefs and ideas of Roberto Suárez Gomez, Bolivia’s ‘King
f Cocaine’ in the 1980s, as documented by his biographer, wife Ayda
evy ( Levy:, 2012 ). 
Roberto was a member of the elite who moved socially at the top of
olivia’s high society. He was an heir of Casa Suárez, a firm founded by
is great grandfather Pedro Federico Suárez Callaú (1837–1908), who
oved from Santa Cruz to Bolivia’s northeast frontier in the 1850s and
tarted the family’s exports of quinine ( Levy, 2012 : Chapter 1). In 1880,
edro’s younger brother Nicolas (1851–1940) explored and mapped the
iver network further downstream and built barracks for rubber tappers
n a strategic location that came to be known as Cachuela Esperanza,
rom where Casa Suárez established a monopoly on the transportation
f rubber during its worldwide boom in the 1880s. In 1883, Casa Suárez
xpanded to London, where another brother, Francisco, registered the
ublicly-listed firm Suárez Hermanos Ltd (later renamed Suárez & Co.
td ), and took charge of raising capital, purchasing property, and organ-
sing the delivery of cargo to and from Cachuela Esperanza. By 1890, the
rm had become the world’s biggest rubber firm, supplying up to 70%
f global demand. Operating in an isolated border area that could not
e secured by the state, Casa Suárez won favourable concession agree-
ents with a national government that effectively delegated many of
ts roles to the company. By the turn of the century, the firm owned
r controlled up to 6.5 million hectares of tropical forests, grasslands
nd farms in Beni, Pando, and Santa Cruz, as well as in Cochabamba
 Fifer, 1970 ; Lehman, 2018 ; Levy, 2012 ; and family records of Nicolas
uárez Callaú in www.myheritage.com ). 
Casa Suárez functioned as a para-state in remote areas with a history
f chronic economic and social restructuring ( Lehman, 2018 ). Faced
ith constant labour shortages on account of its isolation, it weath-
red many crises over the years: (a) the 1899–1903 Acre border war
ith Brazil; (b) the 1920–1940 economic dislocation triggered by the
all of global rubber prices; (c) the 1932–1935 Chaco border war with5 araguay; (d) the subsequent series of coup d’etats following the hu-
iliation of defeat in the border wars; and (d) the rise of various
olitical groups, including the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario
MNR), which came to power in 1952 and implemented sweeping agrar-
an reform policies, including reverting six million hectares of Suárez-
ontrolled land back to government. Though reduced by these crises,
he Casa Suárez empire weathered through because, as Lehman argues,
midst such uncertainties the firm learned to prioritise food production
nd living conditions, cancelled debts, and relied on alternatives such as
attle raising in order to avoid the depopulation of the region. In other
ords, Lehman continues, Casa Suárez developed the view that the ru-
al workforce is in itself a resource and key asset to be preserved in or-
er to survive harsh and uncertain borderland conditions ( Fifer, 1970 ;
ehman, 2018 ). 
Cattle farming, therefore, encouraged settlement and the consolida-
ion of rural towns. It also benefitted from still-existing Casa Suárez in-
rastructure, since live cattle, like rubber, were exported via the firm’s
eet of barges and port stations into Brazil. In 1939, Roberto spent a
ummer holiday with great granduncle Nicolas at Cachuela Esperanza,
ho at 88 remained active and strong and thus saved the young Roberto
rom drowning by pulling him from the swirling Beni river back into
he boat ( Levy, 2012 : Chapter 2). Roberto would go on to expand the
amily’s cattle business. After his marriage to Ayda Levy in 1958, he
nherited Hacienda San Vicente in Santa Ana del Yacuma, with 5000
eads of cattle, and started exporting cattle to Brazil, using steamboats
ented from relatives in journeys that typically took 3 days downstream.
ith business growing, Roberto went on to purchase more haciendas for
is cattle stocks like San Manuel from his brothers, El Chavius from the
ontejos family, and El Carmen from the Castedos, amongst others. By
he 1970s, the couple owned about 250,000 hectares of grazing land
nd 50,000 cattle heads (ibid., Chapter 7). 
oca’s rise in eastern Bolivia 
Though the post-1952 agrarian reform became the final blow that
ed to the official dissolution of Suárez and Co. Ltd in London, the
amily seems to have secured some form of settlement with the gov-
rnment of Victor Paz Estenssoro. By 1962, Roberto was elected sub-
refect of Yacuma province in Beni, while older brother Hugo was ap-
ointed Minister of State for Agriculture ( Levy, 2012 : Chapter 14). The
uárez family’s economic and political presence in Beni, Santa Cruz,
nd Cochabamba continued. They were seen by a national government
ased in the more densely-populated western highland regions not only
s partners in forging stronger political and economic links with the
parsely-populated eastern lowlands, they were also regarded as key ac-
ors for strengthening food security ( Painter, 1994 : 3). 
The reasons for Roberto’s entry into the drugs business remain
nclear, but it appears to have started in the mid-1970s, enabled it
eems by the expansion of coca farming into Cochabamba. Until the
940s, up to 97% of coca fields were in the mountainous Yungas area
 Painter, 1994 : 3). By the 1950s, however, the flat eastern lowlands of
he Chapare in Cochabamba started growing coca. By 1967, Chapare
ad more hectares under coca cultivation than Yungas. A key reason for
he shift, explains Painter, was that roads started to penetrate the low-
ying areas of Cochabamba as part of government efforts to encourage
ettlement into eastern Bolivia, deemed necessary to avoid a repeat of
he loss of territory in the Acre and Chaco wars. When a paved highway
unded by international aid was finished in the 1970s, which coincided
ith the rapid expansion of international demand for cocaine, Chapare’s
ast flat lands had become criss-crossed by a myriad of small paths and
oads running off a main artery. This was unlike Yungas, where no air-
lane could land ( Painter, 1994 : 3–4; Laserna, 1995 ). 
Roberto’s extensive grazing lands and cattle business are essential to
n understanding not only of the infrastructure upon which he built his
rugs business, but also of the relationships of accommodation and pa-
ronage he established and maintained with coca farmers in the eastern
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c  owlands. Roberto was not simply an impersonal drug trafficker or gang-
ter buying and selling coca in the conventional sense: he was also the
atrón or godfather who had direct and indirect personal relationships
ith many of these farmers, some of whom were likely to be tenants
llowed to grow crops, rather than just raise cattle, on the land. 
In the same way that cattle farming benefitted from the foundations
uilt by rubber, Roberto’s drug business benefitted from his cattle infras-
ructure. Roberto trained as a pilot and modernised the cattle business
y building airstrips on his ranches and investing in what became Bo-
ivia’s largest private fleet of small aircraft. With the aircraft, Roberto
as able to transport meat quickly to Bolivian and Brazilian cities, and
ained considerable value added. The same fleet would later run the
upply chains that brought coca base to Pablo Escobar and the Medellin
artel in Colombia, as well as cocaine to French partners in Marseille
 Levy, 2012 : Chapter 12). In 1982, the Reagan administration estimated
oberto’s drugs turnover at $400 million a year ( The Economist, 2000 ).
On 26 December 1982, Roberto hosted a party in San Vicente, which
as a 2.2-km airstrip, ostensibly to celebrate eldest son Roby’s birthday,
ut which was also a meeting of families from Antioquia that banded
ogether under MAS ( Muerte a Secuestadores or Death to Kidnappers).
AS, formed for self-protection after the kidnapping of Martha Nieves
choa by the left-wing M-19 guerrillas, would later become the Medellin
artel. For the party, airplanes were dispatched to Sao Paolo and Rio
e Janeiro to pick up celebrity chefs; to Panama to collect boxes of
hisky, champagne, and other spirits; and to Colombia to bring in Esco-
ar and Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha. When Escobar disembarked, a group
f fourth-generation mariachis from Tecalitlán (Mexico) descended from
 second plane playing ranchera music. As the party started, a prized
horoughbred horse named Piropo arrived on a Super DC-3 plane, a gift
f the Ochoas to Roberto, who in return impressed the Colombians when
e showed off his fully-grown pet jaguar named Kayan ( Levy, 2012 :
hapter 10). It was evident that these were no ordinary mobsters driv-
ng fancy cars. 
he geopolitics of Roberto’s cocaine business 
Important parts of Roberto’s biography are the stories Levy tells
bout the geopolitics of the cocaine business. Apparently, these accounts
ere pieced together not just from what she personally knew, but also
rom an unpublished 500-page ‘Coca-Cocaine Thesis’ in which Roberto
rovided details about his criminal exploits ( Levy, 2012 : Chapter 18). 
Because the Cuban government played a decisive role in the lib-
ration of Martha Nieves Ochoa from the M-19 kidnapping, Escobar
ccepted an invitation to visit Havana in January 1983 and brought
oberto along. In Havana, they were told about the Castro brothers’
trong interest in using drug trafficking as a weapon against US imperial-
sm. A deal was therefore stuck, in which the cartel would pay $1-million
 day for access to Cuban territorial waters and airspace. In return, the
uban navy would not only allow cartel ships and planes smuggling co-
aine to Florida to replenish, the drug traffickers will also be provided
ith intelligence drawn from Russian-supplied radars on the precise lo-
ation of American Coast Guard ships and aircraft ( Levy, 2012 : Chapter
1). 
The deal went smoothly for 16 months, enabling hundreds of tons
f cocaine to be smuggled into the US, while Cuba earned a windfall.
n June 1984, however, it ended after Cuban intelligence found that
oberto and Escobar were also playing with the CIA and Lt. Col. Oliver
orth, in a deal brokered by Panama’s Manuel Antonio Noriega. Appar-
ntly, North and the CIA sought ways to circumvent the Boland amend-
ents in the US Congress, which not only limited the amount but also
et conditions on the aid that the US government could provide to the
ontras fighting the Sandinistas, Cuba’s allies in Nicaragua. Roberto was
o take charge of production; the CIA will organise delivery to US ter-
itory, via Limon Province in Costa Rica; and US-based Medellin cartel
peratives will do distribution and sales. Each then takes a 30% share of6 he profit, with the CIA share used exclusively for funding the Contras
 Levy, 2012 : Chapter 12). 
In order not to mix things up, Roberto set up a new drug lab, called
illa Mosquito, in the most swampy and inhospitable part of Ballivian
rovince in Beni . The complex was built so that the laboratory, ware-
ouses, houses, hangars and other outbuildings for electric generators
nd pumps would not be seen from the air; the only thing visible was a
mall house, a corral and a small herd of five hundred cattle. A catering
ompany supplied fuel, food and other needs, including Brazilian pros-
itutes. The lab produced a thousand kilos of cocaine each day. Two
ercules C-130 aircraft owned by the CIA but registered under the US
ir company Southern Air Transport, which the Bolivians called Aero-
oca, departed each week from Villa Mosquito to transport seven tons
f cocaine to Puerto Limon (ibid., Chapter 12). 
The Cubans, angered at how their Sandinista allies were being un-
ermined, urgently invited Roberto and Escobar for consultations in Ha-
ana. The plan was to arrest the pair in order to scuttle the operation.
owever, officials who negotiated the deal – General Arnaldo Ochoa and
olonel Antonio de la Guardia – warned the pair, allowing them to leave
efore the arresting party arrived. Both officials, bemedaled heroes of
he Cuban Revolution, were later executed in Havana by firing squad
 Levy, 2012 : Chapter 11; Chapter 12; and New York Times, 1989 ). 
ocaine, Inc 
Levy took pains to highlight that her husband was different from
he criminals and warlords with whom he partnered. He was the mild-
annered but cunning patrón , she emphasises, who had ‘the touch for
he common people’ and ‘helped the poor get out of their misery’. Levy
amented the betrayal by General Luis Garcia Meza, who came became
resident via a July 1980 coup that Roberto funded, only to cave in
o US pressure by publishing a list of wanted drug lords with Roberto
nd son Roby on top. The publication caused damage, because Roberto’s
nown properties and assets were frozen, prompting Levy to start the te-
ious task of legally dissociating the family’s assets from those acquired
hrough her husband’s illicit business. This also led to the separation of
he couple, although they remained friends, states Levy, and were seen
ogether in parties they hosted ( Levy, 2012 : Chapter 5; Chapter 18). 
Roberto had a particular hatred for the US, citing how two Ameri-
an companies, tobacco giant Philip Morris and firearms manufacturer
mith and Wesson, kill more people than cocaine (Levy, Chapter 5).
ore importantly, Roberto belittled the US-led ‘war on drugs’ because
e believed that ‘no one can eliminate the largest business in the world’.
he most that anti-drug operations can achieve, he said, is to change the
rokers or intermediaries who organise and profit from the business,
ointing out that when special police and the DEA established bases in
olivia’s coca-producing areas, coca leaf growing increased rather than
iminished ( Levy, 2012 : Prologue). 
Roberto wanted to end the tendency to create a monopoly in the
rugs trade, halt a slide to deadly competition, and smoothen relation-
hips with government. He did this by setting up La Corporacion, which
he Americans eventually called the ‘General Motors of Cocaine’. It func-
ioned more like a loose partnership in an industry where entry is not
ifficult. Its incorporators, drawn from the Bolivian elite, essentially re-
ained autonomous but pooled their resources together to reduce mu-
ual costs, sold materials and services to each other, shared information,
istributed orders, and coordinated where necessary ( Levy, 2012 : Chap-
er 7) 
Perhaps its most important innovation was to attach the illicit drugs
rade to the infrastructure and business links of licit enterprise. For
oberto, it meant not just using the assets of his ranches, but also
he family’s river infrastructure. Steam barges operating from ports on
he Mamore River to Guayaramerin, for example, were used to trans-
ort bulk coca leaves for processing. La Corporacion relied on already-
xisting business infrastructure – letters of credit, bank accounts, pro-
urement lines, warehouses, insurance premia, legal and accounting
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rms, and so on. Roberto explicitly wanted to transform the ‘ant’ traffic
n coca into a centrally-coordinated corporate enterprise. At its height
hen millions of dollars in cash arrived on planes from Colombia each
ay, the couple and their associates joked that ‘it was easier to drain the
amore River than to end the flow of money’ (ibid., Chapter 7). 
As key investment, La Corporacion bought properties on the outskirts
f the Madidi National Park near the Yata River to set up a network of
aboratories for coca processing that its partners could use. A fleet of 30
essna STOL206 (short take-off and landing) aircraft – typically with li-
ense numbers muddied to avoid identification and flown by pilots who
aid bribes of $10,000 to obtain landing rights – were used to bring
n the crude coca base from the Chapare. The processed cocaine paste
ulfate was then transported to Colombia using longer-range turboprop
C-3 aircraft. The pilots ( maruchos) typically earned $15,000 per flight.
 key change Roberto introduced was to increase the sale price of co-
aine base sulfate from $1800 per kilo to $9000 per kilo (ibid., Chapter
). 
olitical connections 
Roberto had many political involvements and was even faulted by
ife Ayda and brother Hugo for squandering money by playing politics.
ccording to Painter, then the BBC’s correspondent in Bolivia, Roberto
as widely believed to have financed the 1978 campaign of General
uan Pereda. Strong evidence also suggests that Roberto financed the
rutal ‘Cocaine Coup’ of 1980 which put into power General Luis Gar-
ia Meza, and ushered in what was perhaps the most violent period
n contemporary Bolivia when the country saw extra-judicial killings,
isappearances, and torture, particularly of union leaders and left-wing
gures opposing the coup ( Painter, 1994 : 58–59). On assuming power,
arcia Meza quickly appointed Colonel Luis Arce Gomez as Interior Min-
ster, whose first act was to authorise the release of key drug traffickers
rom jail ( Levine, 1993 ). Arce is a cousin of Roberto ( Levy, 2012 : Chap-
er 2). 
However, Roberto deplored the violence and ‘useless murders’. There
ere over 500 murders and disappearances, and thousands of tortures
nd imprisonment. Behind it was the mafia-like organisation Novios dela
uerte ( Lovers of Death) led by the infamous Nazi war criminal Klaus
arbie and Argentine military advisers. The Novios were a group of about
00 mercenaries contracted by Arce to hunt down 140 small and mid-
evel drug traffickers, apparently to show to the US that on the contrary,
olivia’s new rulers were also ‘tough’ against drugs. In reality, the Novios
imply cleared the field of lower-level competitors ( Levine, 1993 : loc.
156). 
Levy confirms the Novios also worked for Roberto, mainly to pro-
ide protection for the drug shipments to Colombia by ensuring that
he Colombians paid first, before off-loading the cargoes. The Novios,
he said, were known locally as the Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles) , on
ccount of the images of those birds on the wings of Roberto’s planes.
evy, who has Jewish roots, listed names of the most prominent Novios
nd called them ‘a diverse sample of the international extreme right’
 Levy, 2012 : Chapter 6). 
Political connections to the CIA also came in handy for the drug traf-
ckers. In May 1980, La Corporacion was targeted by a joint US-Bolivia
ting operation, a deception or a ruse intended to catch criminals actu-
lly committing a crime to mount a successful prosecution. It was led by
EA special agent Michael Levine. The sting operation – in which a trial
00 kgs of cocaine was picked up by plane and $9 million in cash paid
nside the vault of a Bolivian bank – resulted in the arrest of two La Cor-
oracion partners, Jose Roberto Gasser and Alfredo ‘Cutuchi’ Gutierrez,
ho were extradited to the US and indicted. However, Gasser was soon
uietly released from jail, and subsequently, the US Attorney’s Office
n Miami dropped all charges. Gutierrez’s bail requirement was lowered
rom $1-million to $10,000, which he quickly posted ( Levine, 1993 : loc.
83). Levine later found the reason for the release – Gasser and Gutier-
ez were assets of the CIA. The 1980s were also the period of La Guerra7 ucia or the ‘dirty war’ against communism in Latin America, and the
IA was protecting its allies. To Levine’s dismay, the targets of the war
n drugs were deemed by the CIA as the allies the US needed in its war
gainst communism (ibid., loc. 1429). 
he end of the king 
Roberto broke off with the Medellin cartel in mid-1984. His-declared
eason was that Medellin operators were undermining his business, but
evy says it was because Roberto deplored his partners’ violence and
egretted enriching Escobar. The timing was significant for two rea-
ons. First, in March that year, the Medellin cartel suffered a serious
low when the DEA and Colombian police destroyed Tranquilandia, the
prawling rural complex with 19 laboratories and 8 airstrips that pro-
uced cocaine exports to the US. This left Roberto with the only sizeable
ungle laboratory facilities in Madidi, Yata, and Villa Mosquito. Second,
he Cuban and CIA smuggling deals ended. But Roberto by then, with-
ut the knowledge of Escobar, had already established ties with a jovial
olombian, Cesár Cano, who had good connections in the Bahamas and
new the coasts and beaches of southern Florida. Over the next few
onths, business with Cano flourished, earning Roberto net profits of
bout $250 million. But the Antioqueños caught up with Cano: 12 hit-
en killed him and his bodyguards in August 1985 on the doorsteps
f his mother’s home in Bogota. Cano’s death unnerved Roberto, who
romptly abandoned his illegal drugs business, and attempted to go legal
y reviving his proposal to government of a new multinational corpora-
ion, modelled after Casa Suárez, capable of processing Bolivia’s excess
oca leaf production into medicinal and other products for a mass mar-
et ( Levy, 2012 : Chapter 13; Painter, 1994 : 1). By that time however,
oberto was already too tainted for his proposal to be considered seri-
usly. 
In July 1988, at the end of Bolivia’s coca boom, Roberto was arrested
n a raid in El Sujo, one of his ranches in Beni ( Painter, 1994 : 27–28).
e was convicted to 15 years and put in a prison near La Paz that,
ccording to Levy, was more like a paradise without freedom, rather
han a purgatory. Roberto was however released in 1996 because his
ealth deteriorated in the highland environment. Put under house arrest
n the lowlands, he spent time working with a journalist and ghost writer
o produce his memoirs, entitled Siempre Rey (Always King), which was
urned down by publishers and filmmakers because it barely mentioned
is criminal exploits. Levy later discovered that Roberto had also written
 longer Tesis Coca-Cocaina that provided many of the details published
n El Rey de la Cocaina in which Levy elaborated on Roberto’s criminal
ackground, but more in the mould of an upper-class Robin Hood (2012:
hapter 18 and Epilogue). 
Before he died in July 2000, a terminally-ill Roberto attempted sui-
ide by barricading himself in his room, brandishing a gun. But an am-
ulance arrived with doctors that succeeded in convincing him to be
rought to a private clinic, where he died five days later. Thousands of
eople, narrates Levy, attended his wake in Santa Cruz. He was buried
n Cochabamba alongside eldest son Roby, who was killed in police cus-
ody in 1990 (ibid.) 
onclusion: deconstructing arbitrage and intermediation 
Details from these preceding life stories affirm that drug lords are
ore than just gangsters and racketeers, they are also important lo-
al political and economic actors who mediate state, society, and mar-
et relationships. Though rural elites in the illicit drug trade defy easy
lassification, it is evident that the Castaños through their tools of vi-
lence played key roles in the consolidation of commercial agriculture
n Uraba; while Roberto was the main supply chain intermediary, who
rovided the business links, transport assets, political connections, in-
luding a loose partnership of gente buena (upper class) traffickers that
ransformed coca cultivation and cocaine-base production from house-
old activity to commercialised industry. 
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The main proposition advanced by this article is that criminal en-
repreneurs survive and thrive because they establish interdependen-
ies as pioneers for capital, intermediaries in commodity chains, and ar-
itrageurs especially in the dangerous places at the margins of state and
arket. 
Roberto emerges as an archetypal pioneer for capital – he was a crimi-
al entrepreneur who was also an informal but effective source of credit,
mployment and investments in territories that have been historically
solated from market networks, have little state presence, and governed
ifferently. Gallant’s point applies – bandits and pirates brought cash
nto typically marginalised areas, thus enabling those territories to be
onnected directly to outside markets over time ( Gallant, 1999 : 37–38).
nd expanding on McSweeney, et.al’s. restatement, rather than being
nathema to private investment in the rural sector, narco-entrepreneurs
create the very conditions for such investments – not everywhere, but
mportantly in the very landscapes most likely to have been closed off
o capital investment prior to the drug traffickers’ involvement’. In-
eed, the narcobourgeoisie use the vast wealth they capture from an
llicit commodity chain to act as neoliberal pioneers, spreading circuits
f capital into new territories: communal, reserved, and public lands
 McSweeney, Richani, Pearson, Devine & Wrathall, 2017 : 16). 
It was during the height of La Corporacion’s operations that the coca-
ocaine economy probably prevented a complete collapse of a convuls-
ng Bolivian national economy. Aside from a deep recession marked by
nemployment and hyperinflation caused by the plunging prices of its
ain exports, gas and minerals, Bolivia was in a political crisis that saw
hree elections and ten changes of government between 1978 and 1982
four by military coup, three by legitimate processes through Congress,
nd three by internal disputes in the Armed Forces ( Laserna, 1995 : 31).
uring this time, coca cultivation and cocaine production ‘clearly acted
s a huge social safety net, absorbing labour from the collapsed mining
nd industrial sectors, and replacing large portions of dollars previously
enerated by minerals, gas, and other exports’ ( Painter, 1994 : 54). High
armgate coca prices, triggered by the strength of demand from La Cor-
oracion’s partners, not only led to the greatest relative increases in
oca production volumes recorded, but also accelerated migration into
he Chapare. In 1975, population growth rate in the Chapare was only
.48%. In 1980, it grew dramatically to 29.25% ( Laserna, 1995 : 19).
he impact of the narcobourgeoisie was on full display at this particular
istorical moment. 
As intermediaries in commodity chains, criminal entrepreneurs can
e ‘fixers’ who use cunning, innovation, violence and their connections
o enable the flow of products, profit and people across these chains
hat run across borders. This was seen most clearly in Vicente’s selling
f the AUC franchise, which provided cover, protection, and a political
tatus to enterprising criminals. The Castaños and Suarez can also be
egarded as agents who link illicit crop farms to the legions of seasonal
r migrating agricultural workers necessary for the processing of coca
ase and cocaine. The Castaños enabled better access to the highway
etworks for banana growers and cattle ranchers after they gained the
pper hand over EPL and FARC forces. Roberto had his fleet of planes
nd river barges for the transport of produce and illicit commodities.
n Blok’s study, the mafia were the gatekeepers and powerbrokers who
ecide who wins or loses in the contestations and competition in local
conomies. 
Finally, as arbitrageurs , criminal entrepreneurs are what Ahram and
ing, quoting Braudel, described as ‘creatures of the borderlands, where
tates and empires had difficulty extending their own power’. They are,
… uniquely gifted boundary-crossers, conducting both violent and
non-violent transactions across political, economic, and cultural
dividing lines. Despite the popular image of warlords as sword-
swinging barbarians ruling despotically from usurped thrones, the
most successful ones turned out to have something that everyone else
wanted: the ability to serve as middlemen across uncertain bound-
G  
8 aries while, in the process, reaping some of the profits for themselves
( Ahram & King, 2012 : 170). 
Gutierrez-Sanin adds a key attribute of arbitrageurs, arguing in his
omprehensive study of Colombian paramilitaries that they were en-
orcers of indirect rule, i.e. ‘non-bureaucratically mediated territorial
ontrol and presence of the state’. It is a strategy of rule, especially in
orderlands, ‘marked by a thin bureaucracy and thick system of partisan
etworks’ ( Gutierrez Sanin, 2019 : 15). 
A key lesson for peacebuilding that emerges from this examination
s the need to identify the sources of power of criminal entrepreneurs
nd address these accordingly. This may be possible by considering two
teps. First, recognising and tackling how criminal entrepreneurs con-
rol or manipulate access to land and other resources, become gate-
eepers for the mobilisation of rural labour, and develop new ways
f accumulating capital. Second is acknowledging extra-legal regimes
f rule in which they, like the state, are only an actor amongst oth-
rs ( Ballve, 2019 ); and that they serve a useful political role for those
n power and ultimately shape state formation as enforcers of indirect
ule ( Gutierrez-Sanin, 2019 ). The recommendation of the UN and the
orld Bank’s Pathways to Peace ( 2018 ) – that criminal networks are ac-
ors, with agency, that should be taken into account in assessing risks
o peacebuilding – needs to be taken up seriously. 
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